

# Nash Equilibria in Co-operative Games

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## ABSTRACT

For the past time the Nash equilibria and economically drastical results for co-operative games were well studied and, even, honored as a Nobel Prize; in this article we present the final equation of the past work.

## INTRODUCTION

We present the result according to probability model and the following consequence:

$$r_i = \frac{v_i}{\sum v_i} \cdot \sum s_i ,$$

where  $\mathbf{R}$  is a set of rationals,  $\mathbf{V}$  is a set of values and  $\mathbf{S}$  is a set of measures.

## CONCLUSION

Thus, we have obtained the general results of the theorem proposed by professor John Forbes Nash.

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